Reported: ten fresh contacts upload and appear on LoTW; twenty older ones,
bulk-edited to exactly the same LOTW_SENT/RCVD state, are accepted by OpsLog
and never arrive. The operator's reading was that a failed attempt could not be
overridden. It is simpler and worse than that.
TQSL's exit codes, from its own cmdline documentation:
8 NO QSOs were processed — already uploaded OR OUT OF DATE RANGE
9 some processed, some ignored — same two reasons
14 some already uploaded, the rest signed
8 and 9 were both read as plain success. So on 8 — nothing uploaded at all —
OpsLog announced "already uploaded (duplicate)" and stamped every selected
contact as sent. They were never on LoTW and now looked as if they were, which
is exactly the reported symptom, and it is not recoverable by re-uploading
because the operator has no reason to try.
"Out of date range" is the cause that bites here: a contact older than the
callsign certificate's validity is silently left out. Older QSOs failing while
today's succeed is the signature.
Now: 8 is a failure and nothing is stamped — a duplicate left at "R" is
harmless and will be refused again, whereas a contact wrongly marked sent is
one nobody will look at twice. 9 and 14 succeed but carry Ignored, and the
caller says so in the console and a toast.
TQSL's own sentence ("20 QSO records are out of date range") is captured and
shown. It was being read and thrown away, and it is the whole answer to "why is
my contact not on LoTW".
TestClublog checked that three fields were non-empty and returned "Ready — CALL
via EMAIL". Nothing was ever sent to Club Log, so a wrong password produced the
identical green message. It now signs in, through getadif.php because that is
the one authenticated endpoint that cannot change anything: a test must never
put a record into someone's log. A future start year keeps it from downloading
130 000 QSOs to prove a password, and a rejected login answers 403 before any
body arrives.
LoTW is two credentials doing two jobs and the button reported only the first.
Uploads go through TQSL signed by the certificate — the website password is
never involved — so a wrong one breaks nothing until the day confirmations are
downloaded, by which time nobody connects the two events. Both are now checked
and, more importantly, reported separately.
Also: the detector still refused 12 and 10 m while the PSK Reporter feed was
already subscribed to them, so those decodes were fetched and thrown away. The
rule was never "HF is out", it is "is an opening here an event" — 20 m being
open is the normal state of the band, 10 m opening is not.
rouggy
