The hard-coded emitters each speak one published format at one fixed moment.
This is the escape hatch, and it exists mainly for antenna switches: they are
driven by a URL, and the band change is the trigger they want.
Four triggers, each carrying its own field set: band change (the RADIO's band,
not the entry form — a switch follows the rig, not what is being typed), QSO
logged, rotator command and callsign lookup. The panel prints the fields the
selected trigger can fill, which is the point of the whole thing: a placeholder
the trigger does not carry renders as nothing, and without the list an operator
writes {freq} on a band change and has no way to learn why the switch never
moved.
Three things the panel cannot show, handled here:
- Escaping. A URL needs every value percent-encoded; a UDP payload must not
be touched. The first portable callsign, F4BPO/P, puts a path separator in
the middle of a query string otherwise — it works on the bench and fails on
the air.
- Blocking. An HTTP call to a switch that is unplugged would otherwise sit
for the operating system's timeout, on the path of a band change. It runs
in the background with a 3 s limit.
- Silence. A switch answering 404 after a firmware update fails exactly like
success looks from here, so the status code is logged, throttled per row.
The rotator trigger hooks the COMMAND rather than the SP/LP buttons, so the
compass and a spot click fire it too, and the path ("SP"/"LP") is passed
through because an azimuth alone cannot say which was taken — 137° is short
path to one station and long to another.
Credentials in a URL are stored as typed. That is the operator's call, on the
grounds that this is LAN gear, and the hint in the panel says so.
Two silences from one operator's log.
The SteppIR is not blocked — it is being overruled. Every tune is commanded,
acknowledged on the next poll with the frequency asked for, then replaced on
the poll after by a different one: 21075 asked, 21075 confirmed, 21050
reported, again and again, with the operator tuning once more each time. Two
minutes of that reads as a dead link. It now says what it is, once, when the
motors have stopped and the reported frequency is more than 10 kHz from the
commanded one — a controller quantising to its own grid is not a fault, one
sitting somewhere else entirely is.
UDP outbound had no positive signal at all: only failures were logged. When
an operator sets up an ADIF message to a second logger and nothing arrives,
"OpsLog never sent it" and "the other program did not take it" looked exactly
the same from here — and the first is the common case, because a row created
as an inbound ADIF listener instead of an outbound ADIF message matches
nothing and emits nothing. Successful sends are logged with their destination
and service, and a QSO logged with no outbound row says so once a session.
Two problems from one operator's log, both of them the log's fault.
SteppIR. The last line about it is "status query failed, reconnecting: Port
has been closed" and then nothing — for the rest of the session. The poll loop
does retry every two seconds, but a failed open was a bare `continue`: no line,
ever. And startUltrabeam had three silent ways out — settings unreadable, the
antenna turned off, no port or host configured — so a cleared field and a lost
adapter produced exactly the same evidence, which is none. Both now say what
happened, with the port or host named. Reopen failures are reported three
times and then throttled (a port that is gone stays gone), and the recovery
says how many attempts it took.
FLDIGI. Four hundred "ADIF payload ignored" lines and nothing else legible.
The cause is in the same log: two inbound listeners on the SAME multicast
group and port, 239.255.0.1:2237 — one WSJT (MSHV), one ADIF (FLDIGI). Every
WSJT-X packet is delivered to both, and an FT8 cycle is dozens of decodes
every fifteen seconds; the bursts in the log are exactly 15 s apart. The ADIF
listener now checks for the WSJT-X magic and says so once, with what to do
about it, instead of rejecting each packet in writing. Anything else is
described a few times with its payload and then goes quiet.
Backend groundwork; the columns and filters that consume it come next.
GRIDS. A CQ is the one WSJT-X message that carries a locator, and wsjtSender was
throwing that token away. It is now returned, validated as a real field+square,
and remembered per callsign. This is the ONLY grid source available: a DX-cluster
line carries the spotter's grid at best and never the DX's, and a per-callsign
QRZ lookup under an RBN firehose is not a trade worth making. So grids are known
for the stations this receiver decoded - which is exactly the FT8/FT4 watering
hole an operator is looking at while grid chasing.
RR73 is why the grid is validated rather than pattern-matched. R is inside A-R
and 73 inside 00-99, so a sign-off satisfies the Maidenhead shape exactly and
would have planted a grid that does not exist into the index, silently.
NEW GRID keys on "GRID|MODE" with the mode put through the same normMode as
everything else, so the "group digital modes" option decides whether a grid
worked on FT8 is still new on FT4 - one rule, no branch. Grids are truncated to
four characters: a log holds a mix of JN36 and JN36QU, and without that the same
square is new forever, once per subsquare.
On cost, which was the condition: one more DISTINCT scan when the status
snapshot is rebuilt, then map lookups per spot. The same shape as the county and
POTA sets it sits beside, and the snapshot exists precisely so a spot batch never
touches the logbook.
Spotter continent and the LoTW flag come from tables already in memory - the
DXCC prefix table and ARRL's user list - so they cost a lookup each. The spotter
continent answers a different question from the DX's: whether anyone near you is
hearing this at all.
"WSJT parse error: bad magic 0x3132372e" named neither the sender nor the
payload, so there was nothing to act on — even though those four bytes are
ASCII "127.", i.e. some program broadcasting an address on a port expecting
WSJT-X binary.
The line now carries the remote address, the size, a printable preview and a
hex dump of the first 96 bytes. Text senders are readable at a glance; a
genuinely binary payload still shows its bytes.
And it stops after five. The reported case wrote that line about 150 times a
second: a permanently misconfigured port would fill the 10 MB rotating log with
one repeated sentence and bury every other piece of evidence — the log's whole
purpose. The fifth line names the two things worth checking, the sender and the
service type.
N1MM's parse error goes through the same path; it had no packet detail either.
rouggy